Edward J. Mishan’s 1967 landmark book, The Costs of Economic Growth, was revolutionary. He was one of the first mainstream economists to argue that rising Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could seamlessly coexist with a decline in human welfare, fueled by unpriced “spillover effects” (externalities) like pollution, urban congestion, noise, and psychological alienation.  

Yet, you rarely hear Mishan’s name or his specific framework cited in modern economic discourse. The phrase “Costs of Economic Growth” hasn’t vanished because the problems disappeared; rather, the discussion was completely hollowed out, rebranded, and fragmented for several distinct reasons.

1. Rebranding as “Sustainability” and “Climate Change”

The most prominent reason Mishan’s broad critique is rarely discussed in his own terms is that environmental economics absorbed and narrow-focused his ideas.

 The Shift: Where Mishan looked holistically at the social, psychological, and physical toll of growth, today’s discourse is overwhelmingly dominated by carbon footprints and global warming.

 The Effect: Mishan’s qualitative anxieties about the “loss of quietude” or the “frantic pace of life” have been replaced by quantifiable metrics. Instead of debating the inherent costs of growth, modern policy focuses on “green growth” or “decarbonizing GDP”—accepting the premise of growth while trying to engineering away its worst atmospheric symptom.

2. The Rise of the “Degrowth” Movement

Where Mishan’s specific vocabulary does survive, it has been radicalized and renamed. The modern “Degrowth” (or post-growth) movement occupies the space Mishan carved out, but it approaches the problem through a highly politicized, neo-Marxist, or eco-socialist lens.

Because Mishan was a traditional welfare economist from the London School of Economics who used rigorous market-failure frameworks, his precise, methodical critique gets drowned out by the more polarized, systemic climate-justice rhetoric of today.

3. Mishan’s Anachronistic Cultural Conservatism

Mishan did not just critique pollution; a massive portion of The Costs of Economic Growth lamented the psychological and moral costs of a hyper-consumerist society. He argued that endless growth fostered a frantic, commercialized culture that destroyed:  

 Traditional communities

 Local craftsmanship  

 “Spiritual peace”

Critically, he linked this commercialization to the rise of what he saw as a fragmented, overly permissive, and hedonistic society. This blending of radical environmental skepticism with deeply traditional cultural conservatism makes his work an awkward fit for modern political camps. Left-leaning environmentalists are alienated by his social conservatism, while right-leaning free-marketeers reject his anti-growth economics.  

4. The Specialization and “Mathiness” of Economics

Mishan wrote in an era when economists still penned sweeping, philosophical, and deeply literate treatises accessible to the public (similar to his contemporaries E.F. Schumacher and J.K. Galbraith).

In the decades following the 1970s, mainstream economics underwent an aggressive shift toward hyper-mathematical modeling and hyper-specialization. Broad, existential questions like “Is the pace of modern life destroying the human spirit?” were pushed out of economics departments and relegated to sociology or philosophy.

5. Institutional “Growth-Mania”

Mishan coined the term “growth-mania” to describe the absolute consensus among politicians and media that a rising GDP is the ultimate proxy for societal success. That mania proved incredibly resilient.

Because national debt frameworks, pension systems, and employment models in modern economies are fundamentally designed as pyramid structures requiring continuous expansion to survive, admitting that growth itself carries net-negative utility is a political non-starter. It is far easier for a politician to discuss “inclusive growth” or “sustainable growth” than to confront Mishan’s thesis that the engine itself is flawed.

The Bitter Irony: Mishan’s core economic tool—Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)—is used by every major government today to evaluate infrastructure and environmental regulations. Yet, while governments use his methods to value a human life or calculate the damage of a new highway, they routinely ignore his macro-warning: that adding up these individual “progress” projects can still result in a society that is poorer in the things that actually matter.

Note: this article was written by Artficial Intelligence (Gemini) !

THIS BLOG WAS ENTIRELY WRITTEN BY AI (Chat GPT)

Sociologists generally agree that social class still matters a great deal in 21st-century Britain, but many argue that the traditional threefold model — “upper, middle and working class” — is no longer sufficient on its own to explain modern inequalities and identities.

Why the traditional class model still matters

The classic British class structure developed around wealth, occupation, education and inherited status. Many sociologists argue these divisions remain visible today.

1. Wealth and income inequality remain strong

The gap between rich and poor in Britain is still large. Ownership of property, private education, inheritance and elite professional networks continue to give advantages to some groups over others.

For example:

• People from wealthy families are more likely to attend elite universities.
• Home ownership strongly shapes financial security.
• High-paying professions remain dominated by people from privileged backgrounds.

This supports the argument that an “upper class” still exists, especially among those with inherited wealth and influence.

2. Occupational divisions still shape life chances

Employment continues to affect:

• income,
• health,
• housing,
• political attitudes,
• educational outcomes.

Manual and insecure work is still associated with poorer life chances, so the idea of a “working class” has not disappeared entirely.

3. Class identity remains culturally important

Many people in Britain still describe themselves as working class or middle class even when their jobs may not fit older definitions exactly. Accent, lifestyle, education and cultural tastes still carry class associations.

For instance:

• private vs state schooling,
• regional accents,
• attitudes toward culture and politics,
• social confidence in elite settings.

Sociologists influenced by Pierre Bourdieu argue that “cultural capital” — manners, tastes, education and social networks — has become just as important as income.

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Why many sociologists think the old model is outdated

Although class still matters, experts argue that Britain has changed dramatically since the industrial era in which the old model developed.

1. Decline of traditional industrial working-class jobs

In the 19th and 20th centuries, class was closely tied to factory and manual labour. Britain is now mainly a service economy.

Many people work in:

• retail,
• hospitality,
• care work,
• technology,
• freelance or gig-economy jobs.

These occupations do not fit neatly into old “working” or “middle” class categories.

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2. Growth of precarious employment

Some sociologists argue a new class has emerged: the “precariat” — people with insecure, temporary or low-paid work.

This idea is associated with Guy Standing, who argues that insecure employment creates new forms of social instability that older class categories fail to capture.

Examples include:

• zero-hours contracts,
• delivery platform workers,
• unstable freelance work,
• rising housing insecurity.

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3. Expansion of education blurred class boundaries

University attendance expanded massively after the late 20th century. Many people now hold degrees but may still experience insecure employment or low wages.

This weakens the old assumption that education automatically produces middle-class security.

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4. Consumption and lifestyle complicate class identity

Modern class divisions are also shaped by:

• housing,
• consumer habits,
• media use,
• cultural preferences,
• social mobility,
• ethnicity and gender.

A skilled tradesperson may earn more than a graduate office worker, making occupation alone less reliable as a class indicator.

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Major modern sociological approaches

The Great British Class Survey

One influential modern study was the 2013 Great British Class Survey conducted by the BBC and researchers from London School of Economics.

The study argued Britain now has seven classes rather than three:

1. Elite
2. Established middle class
3. Technical middle class
4. New affluent workers
5. Traditional working class
6. Emergent service workers
7. Precariat

The researchers argued class today depends on:

• economic capital (wealth and income),
• social capital (networks),
• cultural capital (tastes and education).

This reflects how modern sociology sees class as more complex and multidimensional than older models.

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Marxist perspectives

Sociologists influenced by Karl Marx still argue class fundamentally depends on economic inequality and ownership of wealth.

From this perspective:

• the wealthy capitalist elite still hold disproportionate power,
• workers still depend on selling labour,
• inequality has intensified under modern capitalism.

So while occupations changed, the core class conflict remains.

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Weberian perspectives

• status,
• education,
• credentials,
• lifestyle,
• power.

Following Max Weber, many sociologists argue class is now linked not just to wealth, but also:

This approach better explains why two people with similar incomes may have different social status.

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Overall evaluation

Most sociologists would say the traditional categories are partly relevant but oversimplified.

They remain useful because:

• inequality is still strongly structured by wealth and occupation,
• elites retain major advantages,
• class continues to affect life chances and identity.

But they are less adequate because:

• work patterns have changed,
• identities are more fluid,
• education and culture matter more,
• new insecure social groups have emerged,
• ethnicity, gender and region intersect with class.

A common conclusion among contemporary sociologists is that Britain is still deeply class-based, but class itself has become more fragmented, complex and difficult to define using the old “upper/middle/working class” model alone.

“In Britain and America the masses were…faced with little alternative to the existing , well-established political parties. Nor,with a few exceptions, did they look for any. In Germany , “political space” was opened up for the Nazi breakthrough by the prior fragmentation of support for the parties of centre and right. In Germany, therefore, the economic crisis ushered in … a fundamental crisis of the state. The battleground …was the state itself.” Ian Kershaw

The above is quoted from Ian Kershaw’s biography of Hitler which describes the collapse of the Weimar governments run by traditional parties and the filling of the space by Hitler and the National Socialists. At the time Britain and America didn’t succumb to such a large swing to the Right. But today the US (under Trump) is well along the very hard Right path. And here in Britain we are also turning to the extremes in particular the Reform Party which like the Nazis in the 1930s has a simple, unsophisticated anti-establishment and populist appeal.

At the risk of being accused of following Godwin’s Law the referencing of the growth of Hitler replacing establishment politicians seems legitimate to me. Founding new Parties of the Right, in Germany, Italy and Spain was a direct cause of the Second World War. And in Germany it led directly to the Holocaust. Hitler had learned from his botched coup attempts in the 1920s that only a democratic route to power would succeed.

In modern day Britain UKIP, the “Leave” campaign and now Reform have positioned themselves well to the Right of the traditional parties. In Germany in the Weimar period as the economic crisis deepened many industrialists and conservative elites became fearful of communism and labour unrest. Some began supporting the Nazis as a bulwark against the political left. Whilst this hasn’t happened to any great extent yet in today’s UK the Right (and increasingly Reform) has significant support and funding from business.

The link connecting big business and the underclass that brought Hitler to power we see increasingly in Britain – and it has its modern origins in Trump’s America. Before the 2016 US Election Jeremy Paxman visited Detroit to find impoverished voters saying that they were going for Trump. Their choice was driven by despair. The irony is that Trump was funded by fat cats who, with some justification, saw him as more likely to fund their wealth and privilege. And yet the very poor and the unemployed still overwhelmingly voted for him.

Here the typical Reform voter is a “cultural traditionalist” who is economically anxious, distrusts big business as much as big government, and feels that the current economic system rewards the “wrong” people. Despite that the Party bigwigs include millionaires, an the supporters include rich industrialists like Bamford.

It simplistic to call the 6.4m voters ( 18%) who chose the Nazis in 1930 as just a “protest” vote. Similarly the 2.5m (25%) Reform voters in 2024 were doing more than making an anti establishment protest , though many were certainly doing that.

The line from Hitler to Trump and “Reform” is contentious to describe, for obvious reasons. But the voters in 1930 did perceive that the Nazis represented an alternative to the “established” centre parties , as Ian Kershaw put it. In Britain if not (yet?) in America Reform is an alternative (like it or not). WB Yeats forecast it in 1919:

Expenditure on Welfare is broadly Government providing certain citizens in need with wherewithal to spend. What they spend it on is not specified but it is likely that it will be on essential goods and services – certainly if the welfare is well directed to those genuinely in need. Welfare is generally seen to be driven by idealistic motives, and it should be. But there are also significant macroeconomic benefits.

Consumer expenditure is generally good for the national economy overall — in fact, it’s one of the primary drivers of economic growth in most modern economies. It’s the lifeblood of demand. Without sufficient consumer spending, businesses contract, jobs disappear, and growth stalls. In effect money diverted from taxpayers to expenditure via Welfare payments collectively provides a “demand side stimulus”.

Historically the debate has often been seen as a “Guns or Butter” choice. Perhaps the best known use of the phrase was in Nazi Germany. In a speech on January 17, 1936, Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels stated: “We can do without butter, but, despite all our love of peace, not without arms. One cannot shoot with butter, but with guns.” Referencing the same concept in the summer of the same year another Nazi official, Hermann Göring, announced in a speech: “Guns will make us powerful; butter will only make us fat.^”

The ongoing debate in Britain is essentially a “Guns or Butter” debate. Kemi Badenoch’s recent comments made this crystal clear. She said “So why won’t Keir Starmer fund our military? Because he is too busy spending your money on benefits.” In other words she was unequivocally siding with Goebbels and Gōring in choosing guns rather than butter. In choosing to reduce demand stimulating (and of course morally decent) welfare spending and spending the cash on weaponry.

Opposing the actions of the Israeli government, driven by the obsessive Netanyahu, is not, in itself, antisemitic. The point is that it can be. The problem is a combination of malice and ignorance. Antisemitism is maliciously vile and, often, based on ignorance

Not every attack on Israel, be it verbal or actual, can be factually characterised as an attack on Jews. “Jew Hate” as Times correspondent Stephen Pollard calls it. But most of us do not oppose Israel because it is predominantly a Jewish state nor Netanyahu because he is a Jew. 

Israel’s barely disguised ambition to expand the state permanently into what are predominantly currently Palestinian areas is wrong and grotesquely so. But to say this can invite the charge of being an antisemite. 

What is needed is education. Focus not on Israel’s legitimacy as a homeland for Jews, which is what it was and is, but on its status as a democratic state – the only one in the region. Then ask how such a state can be so abusive of human rights to destroy Gaza and to seek Lebensraum on such a scale. And show how this is not because it’s Jewish but because its leadership is currently so malignant. 

The “power dynamic” , used in Matthew Syed’s piece in The Times today, is a good descriptor closely related to “Entitled” , the title of Andrew Lownie’s excellent book on the former Prince Andrew and his former wife. Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Neither Andrew nor Max Verstappen , another misuser of power according to Syed, had absolute power but they arrogantly thought they did. And that’s enough.

The concept of “Noblesse Oblige” has taken a bashing recently. By fair means or foul, accident of birth or serendipity some people benefit from the power dynamic. In the much older phrase they think that they can walk on water. You do indeed see it in the Oval Office at the moment. This is what used to be called “Position power” where some in high office think they are relieved of the requirement to be decent, or honest, or truthful – even legal. Remember Richard Nixon’s “If the President does it it’s legal.” That is Trump’s mantra.

High achievers are a special breed and success rarely comes from humility. There are exceptions, but not many. The extraordinarily high achiever Elon Musk seems to think that his preeminence in one field gives him insights on everything. In fact it just gives him a platform to spout nonsense from time to time on subjects he knows nothing about. That denigrates him. We see it also with rich men in football from the comparatively benign Alan Sugar to the frankly scary Jim Ratcliffe. Stick to the knitting chaps! 

The argument in favour of exploiting indigenous hydrocarbon reserves is actually much stronger than the one made in The Times leader today. Power generation, which they focus on, is the one part of our energy mix where substitution by renewables is practical and well underway. Wind and Solar, along with biofuels and waste, can replace gas almost completely over time in this sector augmented, as they say, by limited use of gas-fired plant for flexibility.

But energy consumption is about a great deal more than making electricity. Substantial oil and gas consumption is simply not open to conversion to renewables for practical or economic reasons, or both. Aircraft can only fly on oil fuel. And that’s not going to change. Sea-going vessels like container ships, cruise ships and ferries likewise. A significant minority of our railway network cannot economically be electrified and will remain reliant on diesel-powered trains

. The use of gas boilers for heating our offices, hospitals and, especially, our homes will remain for the foreseeable future. Replacing them is possible, but a very long term project. Similarly commercial road transport will remain predominantly oil-powered for decades. And the switch from petrol/diesel to battery power for private cars is a much longer and more problematic challenge than many suggest.

Oil and gas together comprise over 70% of our Primary Energy consumption. If we are going to need oil and gas for a very long time (we are!) it makes total sense to use our own indigenous resources. This improves our energy security and our balance of trade and reduces costs.

“ It is not clear how Trump will guarantee that Netanyahu will not resume the war in future.” William Hague.

Here William Hague gets closest to examining why there is a war and why America is involved, and to a significant extent why it’s increasingly impotent. It isn’t America’s war but Israel’s and especially Benjamin Netanyahu’s. 

That Israel wants to destroy Hamas and Hezbollah is perfectly understandable. These irregular forces have done great damage to Israel and are, incidentally, a severe restraint on the possibility of a peace process achieving anything. But so is Israel itself under Netanyahu, the most bellicose leader the country has ever had.

Removing non state military forces is not easy – the Vietcong and the Taliban showed that. Fighting terrorism isn’t easy either. The response to the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1968 didn’t eliminate Islamic terrorism. Nor did the response to 9/11.

It’s not America’s war – far less, for example, than the eventually botched post 9/11 attack on the Taliban because of their harbouring of Al-Qaeda. There is no moral imperative to Trump’s actions – he doesn’t do moral imperatives. Nor is there any military defence logic. America is not directly threatened (unlike Israel). 

Netanyahu told Trump what he wanted and he complied – for reasons that will no doubt emerge in time. But the American public doesn’t like body bags and if ground troops do get involved there’ll be plenty of them. 

This is from ChatGPT so AI generated. Seems pretty accurate to me and useful.

Here’s a clear, factual overview of major U.S. military actions since World War II, with approximate casualty figures. Numbers vary by source, so think of these as widely cited ranges rather than exact totals.

Major U.S. Military Actions Since WWII

1. Korean War

Context: North Korea invaded South Korea; U.S. led UN forces intervened. U.S. deaths: ~36,500 U.S. wounded: ~103,000 Total deaths (all sides): ~2–3 million (including civilians)

2. Vietnam War

Context: U.S. supported South Vietnam against North Vietnam and Viet Cong. U.S. deaths: ~58,200 U.S. wounded: ~153,000 Total deaths (all sides): ~2–3 million

3. Gulf War

Context: Iraq invaded Kuwait; U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraqi forces. U.S. deaths: ~294 (148 in combat) U.S. wounded: ~467 Total deaths (all sides): ~20,000–50,000+

4. War in Afghanistan

Context: Response to 9/11; targeting al-Qaeda and Taliban. U.S. deaths: ~2,460 U.S. wounded: ~20,700 Total deaths (all sides): ~170,000–240,000+

5. Iraq War

Context: U.S.-led invasion to remove Saddam Hussein. U.S. deaths: ~4,550 U.S. wounded: ~32,000 Total deaths (all sides): ~200,000–500,000+ (estimates vary widely)

6. War against ISIS

Context: U.S.-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. U.S. deaths: ~100 (very approximate) Total deaths (all sides): ~100,000+

Other Notable but Smaller-Scale Operations

Lebanon Intervention

U.S. deaths: 241 (mostly in Beirut barracks bombing)

Invasion of Grenada

U.S. deaths: 19

Invasion of Panama

U.S. deaths: 23

Somalia Intervention

U.S. deaths: 43 (including Battle of Mogadishu)

Kosovo War

U.S. deaths: 0 in combat (a few non-combat fatalities)

Libya Intervention

U.S. deaths: 0 in combat (1–2 non-combat incidents)

Big Picture

Highest U.S. casualties: Vietnam War Korean War Post-9/11 conflicts (Afghanistan + Iraq): ~7,000 U.S. deaths combined Much lower than Cold War-era wars, but prolonged Trend: Shift from large-scale wars (Korea, Vietnam) → to short, high-tech conflicts (Gulf War) → to long counterinsurgency wars (Afghanistan, Iraq)

One wonders if Energy Secretary Ed Miliband has actually studied Britain’s Primary Energy mix? Some of our hydrocarbons use can be substituted by renewables. Power generation where wind/solar can replace gas. Personal transport where the car park can switch from petrol/diesel to battery power. But elsewhere it’s either not economic or impossible.

Many energy uses are oil or gas specific – that is in the short to medium term there is no renewables alternative. The list is quite long:

▪️Air travel – aircraft can only fly with engines powered by oil fuel

▪️Marine – container ships (crucial) run only on fuel oil

▪️Space heating. The switch from gas-fired boilers to alternatives is a very long term project

▪️Commercial Road Transport is likely to be predominantly diesel powered for the foreseeable future

▪️Cars and motor cycles. The switch to battery power is also a very long term project

▪️Diesel trains cannot economically be replaced by electric in most cases. The cost of electrification of the lines is often prohibitive 

There are other examples. We will need oil and gas for the foreseeable future. It makes sense for security and balance of payments reasons to use indigenous sources and explore for more.